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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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DANNIELS. DENNIS, RAY 
NIELSEN I P. LLOYD SELLENEIT I 
GLEN E. BROWN and RAY S. 
SCHMUTZ, 
Plaintiffs -Respondents 
-vs-
SCOTT M. MATHESON, GOVERNOR 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, RICHARD 
JENSEN, AUDITOR OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, and DALE D. WILLIAMS, 
UTAH FINANCE DIRECTOR, 
Defendants - Appellants 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15814 
This is an action brought by five Utah State Representatives seeking 
a declaration that H. B. No. 48, Appropriation for Low Income Housing by 
Representative Sherman D. Harmer, Jr. of the 1978 Budget Session of the 42nd 
Legislature, was unconstitutionally enacted. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
H. B. No. 48 was declared to have been unconstitutionally enacted 
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and to be null and void and of no effect by Judgment dated March 29, 1978, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties submitted this matter to the District Court on StipuJa! 
facts, That Stipulation was supplemented at trial by the introduction of copie: 
of the House Journals, the Senate Amendment to H. B. No. 48, and the opiruc 
of the Legislative Counsel. 
Plaintiffs would only stress that the failure of the House of 
Representatives to take a final vote on H. B. No. 48, as amended, and to rec: 
in its journal the vote on motion to concur in the Senate amendment was not 11. 
result of clerical error. Even the House Journal for the 20th day reflects that 
H. B, No. 48 was considered further by uncircling only moments before 
midnight, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22, '1 
ARE MANDATORY. 
follows: 
Section 22 ,Article VI, of the Constitution of Utah provides as 
" Every bill shall be read by title three separate times in 
each house except in cases where two-thirds of the house 
where such bill is pending suspend this requirement, Exc;;ept 
general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and 
general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing 
more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed 
I 
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in its title, The vote upon the final passage of all bills 
shall be by yeas and nays and entered upon the respective 
journals of the house in which the vote occurs, No bill 
or joint resolution shall be passed except with the assent of 
the majority of all the members elected to each house of 
the Legislature, 11 
The records shows that the procedure followed in the Utah 
Legislature is to take a final record vote after concurring in an amendment. 
In fa ct, the vote on a motion to concur customarily is, and was in this case, 
taken by voice vote. An electronic vote is sometimes taken for the purpose 
of expediting a count. When an electronic vote is taken for the purpose of 
expediting a count, such as in this case, neither the vote total nor the vote 
of each individual representative is recorded, 
It should be recognized at the outset that the 11 motion to 
concur" is the last or final vote taken in the legislatures of many states. 
There is no constitutional prohibition against the 11 motion to concur" being 
the last or final vote in the State of Utah. However, in order that the 11 motion 
to concur" be the last or final vote in Utah, compliance must be had with 
Article VI, Section 2 2, of the Constitution of Utah. The vote on 11 motion to 
concur" would have to be taken by yeas and nays and entered upon the 
respective journals, Further, that vote would require the assent of the 
majority of all members elected to each house. In the case of the Utah 
House of Representatives, a majority of all members elected is 38. 
The mandatory nature of constitutional provisions for the journal 
entry of votes upon final passage has been considered by other courts. In 
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County Commissioners of Washington County v Baker, 141 Md. 623, 
119 AU. 461 ( 19 22), the Maryland Supreme Court held a similar 
constitutional provision to be mandatory and gave its reasoning by quotrng 
from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th .t.d, at page 168: 
11 It is also provided in the Constitutions of some of the 
states that, on the final passage of every bill, the yeas and 
nays shall be entered on the journal. Such a provision is 
designed to serve an important purpose on compelling each 
member present to assume as well as to feel his due share 
of responsibility in legislation, and also in furnishing 
definite and conclusive evidence whether the bill has been 
passed by the requisite majority or not. ' The Constitution 
prescribes this as the test by which to determine whether 
the requisite number of members vote in the affirmative. 
The office of the journal is to record the proceedings of 
the house, and authenticate and preserve the same. It 
must appear on the face of the journal that the bill passed 
by a constitutional majority, These directions are all clearly 
imperative. They are expressly enjoined by the fundamental 
law as matter.Sof substance, and cannot be dispensed with 
by the Legislature, ' 11 
119 AU, 461, 464 
Such a provision was also held to be mandatory in State ex.re!. 
General Motors Corp, v, City of Oak Creek, 49 Wis. 2d 299, 182 N. W, 2c 
481 ( 1971). In that case the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a numbe:'. 
of decisions and then announced the rule supported by the great weight of ' 
authority: 
"By the great weight of authority it is held that an t:nrolled 
bill will be declared void where the journals fail to show 'ch 
1 
upon final passage thereof a yea and nay vote was taken whi . 
together with those voting for and against a measure was spreac: 
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upon the journals if the constitution so requires. It has been 
so held in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, 
Idaho, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, Virginia, Wyoming, and 
in the federal court. For citation of authorities see 40 L R A 
N. S., p. 19, under heading 'Failure to Record Vote as · . ·' 
Constitution Directs. " 
182 N. W. 2d 481, 492 
This Court has considered the mandatory nature of constitutional 
provisions on at least two occasions. The decision in Ritchie v. Richards, 
14 Utah 345, 47 Pac. 670 ( 1896), is replete with references to the mandatory 
nature of constitutional provisions. In fact, the Court specifically referred to 
the restrictions of Article VI, Section 22, as mandatory, The syllabus by the 
Court reads as follows on page 670: 
" 6. The limitations and restrictions contained in article 6, 
section 14, 22, 24, and in section 8, art, 7, of the 
constitution of this state, respecting the enactment of laws, 
are mandatory and binding upon the legislature, The man-
datory provisions of the constitliion are conclusive upon 
all departments of government. Per Bartch, J. Miner. J. , 
concurring, " 
Although Article VI, Section 22 has since been amended, this 
Court recently cited the Ritchie case with approval in Dean v. Rampton, 
538 P. 2d 169 (Utah 1975). In Dean v. Rampton this Court was concerned 
with the constitutional requirement that the presiding officer sign all bills 
within five days following adjournment, In holding that bill to have been 
constitutionally enacted, this Court looked to the purpose behind the 
"mandatory" requirement, The Court expressly recognized that any other 
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interpretation would permit the frustration of clearly expressed legislative 
intent by inadvertence or by, in effect, establishing a veto power in the 
presiding officer. The case of Jensen v, Matheson, No. 15826, to be 
argued concurrently with this case, is similar to Dean v, Rampton because 
inadvertence and neglect is again involved. In Jensen v. Matheson the 
error might be considered as clerical, The possibility then arises that the 
clear legislative intent could be frustrated by a clerical mistake or by 
clerical sabotage, 
The instant case presents an entirely different situation. 
No mistake or inadvertence is involved. The House of Representatives 
followed its own recognized procedure and simply did not reach a final 
vote on H.B. 48 before midnight on the 20th day, This is reflected in 
the journal by the absence of any vote total or individual votes after 
Senate amendment. 
In Hansen v, Jensen, Case No. 15433, filed September 30, 
1977, this Court considered the same constitutional provision. The Court 
looked to the purpose for recording votes in the journal and held that 
compliance was had when the vote of each individual senator could be 
ascertained from the journal. 
In this case, the vote on motion to concur was the last 
vote taken (except to circle and uncircle ) , and with respect to that 
vote, the house journal is silent. Constituents will know how their 
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representatives voted only if the journal entry requirement is held to be 
mandatory, The Constitution of Utah by Article I, Section 26, expressly 
states that its provisions are mandatory: 
"The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared 
to be otherwise. " 
POINT II. 
FINAL PASSAGE OF A BILL OCCURS AFTER THE BILL IS IN ITS 
FINAL FORM AND AFTER ANY AMENDMENTS. 
The record clearly shows that no vote was taken on H. B. No. 48 
after the motion to concur, except to circle and later to uncircle, If the vote 
on motion to concur was considered as the vote on final passage, the 
constitutional requirement that the vote be taken by yeas and nays entered 
upon the journal would clearly not be met, The only alternative is to consider 
the initial vote taken by the House, prior to amendment by the Senate, as the 
vote on final passage, The defendants apparently urge such an interpretation 
upon this Court, 
Since similar references to "final passage" are common in 
state constitutions, other states have been faced with this same issue. 
The better reasoned decisions hold that the initial vote taken by the 
originating house does not constitute final passage where the bill is 
subsequently amended by the other house, one such decision clearly 
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defining " final passage" is Minnehaha County v, South Dakota State Board 
of· Equalization, 176 N. W. 2d 56, 59 ( S.D. 1970): 
" •.• Final passage of a bill occurs in either House when it 
receives the required vote taken by the ayes and nays on 
roll call following la st reading of a bill, for there is nothing 
further br that House to do relative to it other than trans rnit it tc 
the other House for its consideration and if that House approves 
it as passed in the other by the required vote and record, thati: 
not merely final passage in that branch but "final passage" of 
the bill because it has passed both Houses in the same form 
and there is nothing further for either of them to do to complete 
it, But in case the House to which it is transmitted amends it 
and returns it to the House in which it originated, it is clear 
that concurrence by this House completes the passage of the 
bill and this act is "final passage" within the meaning of 
Art. III, Sec, 18, .. " 
If the initial vote before Amendment was considered as "final 
passage" the mandatory provisions of Article VI, Section 22, would be circuffi·1 
vented. The potential abuses become obvious when the cases are considered, 
In Roane Iron Co. v. Francis, 130 Tenn. 694, 172 S. W. 
816 ( 1915), the initial vote taken by the Senate obtained the necessary 17 
votes for a constitutional majority, but the vote on acceptance of the conferen! 
committee report received only a majority of the votes cast and not a 
I 
I 
constitutional majority, In holding the particular bill to have been unconstitul:~ 
enacted, the Court said: 
"We are of the opinion that the object of the makers of the 
Constitution was to require the assent of such a constitutional 
majority to all of the provisions of the act on passage-- not 
merely or necessarily the third passage, The third passage of 
I 
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the bill under rev.i.ew by the Senate was not its final 
passage, since it was amended to make it satisfactory 
to the House, *** If the contrary be true, and the 
Senate needed only to make the report of the conferees 
(with its amendment for the first time sought to be im-
ported into the measure) the action of the upper branch 
by a majority of a quorum, it is easily to be seen that 
the solemn mandatory check of the Constitution may be 
subverted by a resort to a parliamentary trick ... " 
172 s.w. 816, 816,817. 
In Cox v. Stults Eagle Drug Co., 42 Ariz. 1, 21 P. 2d 914 
( 1933),the Arizona Supreme Court considered an emergency measure which 
required a two-thirds vote, The initial house vote carried with two-thirds 
in the affirmative. However, the concurrence in the Senate amendments 
received only a bare majority. The bill was declared unconstitutional. A 
contrary decision would have permitted the bill, as amended, to pass without 
the constitutional two-thirds vote, 
", •• But in case the House to which it is transmitted amends 
it before passing it on third reading and as amended returns 
tt to the House in which it originated, it is clear that con-
currence in the amendments by this House completes the 
" final passage 11 within the meaning of the Constitution 11 
11
, • • But those decisions which hold that concurrence by the 
House in which a bill originates and is passed with the 
amendments made by the other House constiiutes "finul 
passage 11 announce, as I see it, the better rule, because 
they are based on the situation that actually exists and on 
reason so sound that it is unanswerable, . , 11 
21 p. 2d 914 , 915 
In Ca{i::s v. Cole, 129 Tex. 370, 102 S. W, 2d 173 ( 1937), 
the original House vote was taken by voice vote without being recorded in 
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the journal, However, the concurrence in a Senate amendment by the Ho~ 
was properly taken by yeas and nays, The bill was thus upheld, If the 
initial vote had been considered as 11 final passage 11 , there would have be, 
no supporting journal entry, 
It is clear that the object of the provision of the 
Constitution above quoted is that if a bill is to take effect 
immediately on its passage, it must contain an emergency 
clause and such bill must be passed by a vote of two-thirds 
of all the members elected to each house, and such vote 
to be taken by yeas and nays and er1ered upon the journals, 
We think the rule prescribed by the Constitution also applie: 
to amendments and reports of conference committees. If thi: 
were not true, it is quite obvious how the rule could be 
abused. A harmless bill might be passed in its inception by 
the requisite vote, and then be radically amended and such I 
amendments be put into immediate effect without the vote · 
required by the Constitution. If such were the rule, the vot' 
on the original bill would control as to whether it became a 
law immediately after its final passage, and not the final vot.1 
subsequently taken on the amendments placed thereon by I 
the other branch of the Legislature, and the plain provision 
of the constitution requiring that it be adopted by a vote 
of two-thirds of all the members of each house, in order to 
declare an emergency, could be evaded. " 
102 s. w. 2d 173, 195 
·11 In County Commissioners of Nashington County v, Baker, h' 
Md, 623, 119 Atl. 461 ( 1922 ) , the bill was initiated in and passed by tr: 
House. The bill was later amended by the Senate and still later amended, I 
again by a conference committee, The bill as finally amended was passeo, 
by the Senate. 
However, the bill, as a mended, was not given further acti~' 
· d h · ·1 ·aJ ~'~ If the Maryland Supreme Court had cons1dere t e im 1 , 
by the House, 
vote as constituting "final passage", the bill, as amended, would have 
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been valid without any Senate action whatsoever, 
The facts of Norman v. Kentucky Board of Managers of World's 
Columbian Exposition, 93 Ky, 537, 20 S,W, 901 ( 1892), ire substantially 
identical to the facts in the instant case, The bill there originated in the 
senate and was passed by that body upon the proper vote entered upon the 
journal. The bill was then amended by the House and passed by the proper 
vote entered in its journal, However, when the bill came back to the Senate, 
amendments were concurred in without a yea and nay vote, and without the 
vote of a majority of the members elected, The Kentucky Supreme Court 
held that bill to have been unconstitutionally enacted, If that case had been 
decided otherwise, and similarly if H. B, No. 48 is held to be constitutional, 
the effect would be the approval of that act as amended by less than a 
constitutional majority and without the votes being entered on the journal, 
The reason behind the constitutional requirement, to hold legislators account-
able for their votes, would thus be defeated. The object of recording votes 
in the journal is appropriately illustrated by the language of the Kentucky 
Supreme Court: 
" , •. The words 'final passage', as used in our 
constitttion, mean final passage, They do not mean some 
passage of a part of a bill, or what is first introduced, 
and which may, by reason of amendment, become the 
least important, If so, then the body may pass what is 
practically a new bill in a manner counter to both the letter 
and spirit of the constitution, When the bill was voted on in 
the senate, as amended, and after its returnfrom the house, 
there never was any further action by the senate. It was the 
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final vote, and therefore its final passage; and, being so, 
a majority vote of all the members elected, with an entry by 
yea and nay vote upon the journal, was necessary to its 
constitutional enactment, The bill, as approved by the 
speakers of the two houses and by the governor, never 
was passed by the senate, by a majority of all its members, 
nor by a yea and nay vote. " 
20 S, W, 900 I 902 
" ... It is conceded by the counsel for the appellees, and 
seems plain , that this mode of proceeding did not conform to 
the constitution, It complied with it in neither letter nor 
spirit, The object of the section above cited was to have the 
assent of a majority of all the members elected to each house 
to all the provisions of the act, and that this should appear 
by a yea and nay vote entered upon its journal. If a bill, 
after passing one house in the proper manner, and then, after 
amendment, passing the other house in like manner, could 
come back to the house in which it originated, and be 
adopted by a majority of those voting, or a quorum, it would 
defeat this object, and render the section ineffectual. Let us 
look at it practically, An appropriation bill of $100. 00 
originates in the senate, and is properly passed. It goes to 
the house, where it is amended by making the sum $10 ,000, 
and is then properly passed by it, It returns to the senate 
for concurrence, and is adopted as amended, by a majority 
of those present, without a yea and nay vote, Can it be well 
contended that this would be a compliance with the 
constitution? •. , " 
20 s. w. 900' 902 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY FACTS PROPERLY BEFORE 
In this case the parties entered into a Stipulation containing 
certain relevant facts, It is obvious that the source of some facts was 
neither the enrolled bill nor the House Journal. In the companion case of 
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ll'nsen v, Matheson, Case No. 15826, the source and admissibility of 
evidence will likely be determinative, However, in this case, the judgment 
is clearly supported by reference to mly those facts or the evidence found in 
House Journals, 
There are basically three alternative sources of evidence, The 
" enrolled bill doctrine" does not permit the court to look beyond the enrolled 
bill-- not even to the legislative journals, The 11 affirmative contradiction rule" 
takes a middle position and allows reference to the legislative journals. A 
third rule would permit reference to other legislative sources, 
A review of the authorities will soon disclose that there exists 
a great diversity of opinion among the courts as to what evidence is admissible 
to impeach the validity of a statute, 82 C, J. S,, Statutes, Sec, 85; l 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec, 15.04 et. seq, ( 1972} To this 
writer there appears to be a trend towards more liberal admission of evidence, 
Nevertheless, in 82 C. J. S, , Statutes, Sec, 85 at page 141, the general 
rule is given as follows: 
"Broadly speaking the courts agree that as a general rule 
extrinsic evidence other than legislative journals is 
inadmissible to impeach the validity of a statute, 11 
The Utah Supreme Court directly ruled on this issue in 1896. 
At that time, in Ritchie v, Richards, 14 Utah 345, 47 Pac. 670 ( 1896), this 
Court decided between the " enrolled bill doctrine 11 and the " affirmative 
contradiction rule, "This Court adopted the latter rule and held it proper to 
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take judicial notice of the legislative journals. The Ritchie case was cited 
with approval in Dean v. Rampton, 538 P. 2d 169 (Utah 1975), for the pro-
position that the legislative journals were a proper source of evidence. In 
Ritchie, this Court stated the 11 affirmative contradiction rule" as follows 
on page 676: 
11 
•• , and if, in such case, it should affirmatively appear 
upon the journals or either of them, that in passing the 
act the legislature had disregarded a mandatory provision 
of the constitution, the court would be justified in holding 
the same unconstitutional and void. If, however, the 
journals are merely silent as to the subject under investi-
gation, then the presumption that the legislature acted 
according to its delegated power should prevail, unless 
an omission of some matter which the constitution expressly 
requires to be entered therein be shown by such journals 
or either of them.,., 11 (emphasis added) 
Although the 11 affirmative contradiction rule" as stated by the, 
Court appears to consider all constitutional provisions as mandatory, itcle:/ 
draws a distinction between those matters required to be entered in the 
journals and those matters not specifically required to be entered in the 
journals, In Utah, the only proceeding specifically required to be entered 
in the legislative journals is the " ... vote upon the final passage of all 
bills, .• by yeas and nays, .. ". From the "affirmative contradiction rule" 
as stated by this Court, it is clear that silence of the journal as to 
mandatory constitutional provisions is not fatal unless compliance with that/ 
constitutional provision is specifically required to be entered in the journal. 1 
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This aspect of the "affirmative contradiction rule" is similarly 
stated by authorities, 
"Mere silence of the legislative journals in respect of 
a particular matter is insufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption that an act was validly passed, unless the 
matter is one mandatorily required to be recorded in the 
journals, in which case their silence on the subject will 
result in invalidating the act. 
82 C. J. S. , Statutes, Sec, 89b, P, 148 
* * * * 
" If the constitution requires certain proceedings in the 
process of legislation to be entered in the journal, the 
entry is a condition necessary to the validity of the act, 
The most frequent requirement is the recording of the vote 
on final pas sage of a bill, together with the names of those 
voted, This provision must be strictly complied with and 
no presumption that the required vote was given will arise 
if the journal is silent, It must affirmatively appear in the 
journal that there has been a compliance with the 
constitutional provision, " 
1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec, 15.13, P. 425 
( 19 72) 
In thi:> case the contemplated vote on final passage was never 
taken because time ran out, But even if the vote on motion to con::ur was 
considered as final passage, there would still exist no journal entry showing 
the individual votes or the vote total, This omission of a matter constitutionally 
required to be entered in the journal can be ascertained from the House Journal 
without resort to other evidence, Neither the vote total nor the vote of each 
individual representative appears at page 33, or elsewhere, in the -House 
Journal for the 20th day, on this basis alone, the Judgment can be sustained, 
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Reference to the vote total from a private journal and to the transcript 
merely point out the potential abuse in not following the constitutional 
mandate and more clearly show that the failure of H.B. 48 was not due to 
clerical error. 
This Court has held on numerous occasions that a judgment 
under review should be affirmed if it is sustainable on any proper legal 
ground apparent from the record whether or not the trial judge gave the com1 
reason for his ruling, Rasmussen v. Davis, 1 Utah 2d 96, 262 P. 2d 488 ' 
( 1953); Foss Lewis & Sons Constr. Co. v. General Insurance Company of I 
America, 30 Utah 2d 290, 517 P. 2d 539 ( 1973); Edwards v. Iron County, 
531 P. 2d 476 (Utah ·1975) 
CONCLUSION 
This suit was brought for the purpose of clarifying legislative' 
rules and procedure. It is imperative that legislators know the status of I 
biU. at all time<, and particuiady upon adjournment <ine die. Neith" ho••! 
bills struck down on technicalities after adjournment nor having bills j 
rise from the ashes after adjournment, like the legendary Phoenix, contribute' 
to good government. This Court should fashion a rule which will assist 
the Legislature in the orderly conduct of its business. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ORVAL C. HARRISON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs- Respondents 
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